

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS:PARM
SUBJECT: SALT A-414

U.S. SALT DELEGATION REQUESTS FOLLOWING TEXT OF A-414
MEMCON, BETWEEN AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AND MINISTER SEMENOV,
OF OCT. 23, 1973 BE REPEATED TO MOSCOW AND USNATO.

DISCUSSION:

1. MINISTER SEMENOV OPENED THE MEETING NOTING THAT HE
WOULD SPEAK FIRST BY PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON.
2. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AGREED.
3. MINISTER SEMENOV THEN READ A STATEMENT SETTING FORTH
SOVIET VIEWS ON LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AS COVERED IN ARTICLE II OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT
TABLED ON OCTOBER 9, 1973.
4. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON THANKED MINISTER SEMENOV AND
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STATED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A STATEMENT TO MAKE.

5. MINISTER SEMENOV THEN ASKED ABOUT THE TIMING AND PLACE
OF THE NEXT MEETING.

6. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON SUGGESTED 11:00 A.M. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26 AT THE U.S. MISSION.

7. MINISTER SEMENOV AGREED AND ADJOURNED THE MEETING.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 23, 1973

8. THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION SET FORTH ITS CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE USSR DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT TABLED OCTOBER 9, 1973. IN RESPONSE TO THIS WISH WE BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO SAY THE FOLLOWING TODAY.

9. IN THE COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEFINE PRECISELY, SPECIFICALLY WHICH TYPES OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. ARTICLE II OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON OCTOBER 9, 1973 DEALS WITH THIS MATTER.

10. IN RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT, IT IS NECESSARY TO BE GUIDED, ABOVE ALL, BY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS. AN OBJECTIVE AND UNBIASED APPLICATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ARMS TO BE LIMITED MUST INCLUDE ALL THOSE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH, BY THEIR CHARACTERISTICS OR AS A RESULT OF THEIR GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT, ARE CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE.

11. SUCH AN APPROACH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE ACCURATELY, ON THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVE FACTORS, PRECISELY
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WHICH WEAPONS ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERATION AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THEREBY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARBITRARY, SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS PRECLUDED, AN INTERPRETATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE BY UNJUSTIFIABLY NARROWING OR EXPANDING THE COMPOSITION OF SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED.

12. IT FOLLOWS FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS THAT THERE IS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES THAT THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT, OF COURSE, INCLUDE THOSE TYPES OF

WEAPONS WHICH ARE COVERED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE, I.E., ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SLBM SUBMARINES.

13. IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED TO INCLUDE IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC AVIATION. ACCORDINGLY, ARTICLE II OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT SPECIFIES THAT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INCLUDE STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

14. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST ALSO INCLUDE NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED ON ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. ATTACK CARRIERS WITH DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD ARE, IN ESSENCE, NOTHING BUT MOBILE AIRFIELDS. WHEN ATTACK CARRIERS ARE ADVANCED BEYOND CERTAIN LIMITS, THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT NUCLEAR STRIKES ON TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. THUS, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THIS TYPE OF WEAPON MUST BE INCLUDED IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

15. SUBJECT TO LIMITATION IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT MUST ALSO BE ANY TYPES OF MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND ANY TYPES OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. ACCORDINGLY, ARTICLE II OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT SPECIFIES THAT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ALSO INCLUDE "OTHER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC
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DEPLOYMENT ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY."

16. PRECISELY SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

17. ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1973 THE USSR DELEGATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS, REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF DIVIDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INTO "CENTRAL" AND "NON-CENTRAL," AS BEING UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

18. INDEED, IN WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT THERE IS NO BASIS AT ALL FOR DIVIDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INTO TWO CATEGORIES, PROVIDING FOR A SEPARATE APPROACH TO EACH OF THEM, WITH ONLY A PART OF THE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OBJECT TO LIMITATION, WHILE ONLY SOME GENERAL NON-SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE ASSUMED WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

19. COULD A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, WHICH OUT OF ALL THEIR TOTALITY WOULD SINGLE OUT AND LIMIT ONLY THOSE TYPES OF THESE WEAPONS, WHICH TO ONE SIDE APPEAR TO BE MOST IMPORTANT OR DESTABILIZING, WHILE THE OTHER PART OF THE TYPES OF THESE WEAPONS POSSESSING THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD AT THE SAME TIME BE COMPLETELY IGNORED?

20. SUCH AN APPROACH CAN ONLY BE EXPLAINED AS BEING AIMED AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. SUCH A DIVISION AND THE PROPOSAL BASED THEREON TO LIMIT ONLY PART OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED CONSTRUCTIVE, SINCE THEY CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS AGREED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, MUST GUIDE US IN WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION
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OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

21. IN CONSIDERING THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT IS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION ORGANICALLY CONNECTED THEREWITH--PRECISELY WHAT WEAPONS, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THEIR OPERATIONAL READINESS AND TECHNICAL STATE, ARE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

22. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO UTILIZE THE EXPERIENCE GAINED IN RESOLVING AN ANALOGOUS QUESTION DURING THE WORKING OUT OF THE ABM TREATY, NATURALLY WITH DUE ACCOUNT FOR THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

23. IN ORDER THAT THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN AN AGREEMENT BE EFFECTIVE AND BE FULLY COMPLIED WITH, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES TO RECORD THAT THEY SHALL EXTEND TO THOSE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH ARE:

- OPERATIONAL;

- UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNDERGOING OVERHAUL, REPAIR OR CONVERSION, OR TESTING ASSOCIATED WITH THESE ACTIVITIES;

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- PLACED IN RESERVE OR MOTHBALLED.

24. IN THE COURSE OF PRECEDING NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES SPOKE IN FAVOR OF COMING TO AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONS ON THAT SCORE, AND WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF

OF THIS QUESTION THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN A COMMON UNDERSTANDING.

25. REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE II OF THE SOVIET DRAFT WOULD BE A SERIOUS STEP OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
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